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Recent Decisions
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS-MALPRACTICE-STANDARD OF CARE-The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that the "locality rule"
in regard to the standard of care of physicians and surgeons is no longer
applicable.
Brune v. Belinkoff, - Mass. -, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
Plaintiff was delivered of a baby at St. Lukes Hospital in New Bedford,
Massachusetts, a city of about 100,000 located approximately fifty miles
from Boston. During the delivery, defendant, a specialist in anesthesi-
ology practicing in New Bedford, administered a special anesthetic to
the plaintiff. Eleven hours after the delivery plaintiff fell while attempt-
ing to get out of bed and complained of weakness and numbness in her
left leg. She brought an action against the anesthesiologist alleging neg-
ligence in the amount of spinal anesthetic administered.' Expert testi-
mony showed the dose to be excessive and plaintiff's condition a result
thereof.2
The gravamen of the appeal concerned the trial court's charge as to
the standard of care required of the defendant physician.3 The lower
court charged:
[The defendant] must measure up to the standard of professional
care and skill ordinarily possessed by others in his profession in
the community, which is New Bedford, and its environs, of course,
where he practices ..... If, in a given case, it were determined by
a jury that the ability and skill of the physician in New Bedford
were fifty percent inferior to that which existed in Boston, a defen-
dant in New Bedford would be required to measure up to the
standard of skill and competence and ability that is ordinarily
found by physicians in New Bedford.4
The plaintiff excepted, contending that "distinctions based on geogra-
1. The anesthetic was a mixture of eight milligrams of pontocaine in one cubic centi-
meter of ten percent solution of glucose.
2. There was some testimony as to the amount of anesthetic used in relation to the
differences in obstetrical technique between Boston and New Bedford. The issue was
not dealt with by the court. See n.1, at 795 of 235 N.E.2d 793.
3. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 559
(1959). McCoid stated that the common elements to determine the standard of care are:
(I) a reasonable or ordinary degree of skill and learning;
(2) commonly possessed and exercised by members of the profession(3) who are of the same school or system as the defendant
(4) and who practice in the same or similar localities;
(5) and exercise of the defendant's good judgment.
4. As quoted by the Brune court at 795 of 235 N.E.2d 793.
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phy are no longer valid in view of modern developments in transporta-
tion, communication and medical education....,5
The Supreme Judicial Court, after a thorough examination of the
background of the rule in Massachusetts and several recent decisions of
other jurisdictions, faced the issue squarely, stating: "We are of the
opinion that the 'locality rule' . ... is unsuited to present day condi-
tions."6 The court felt the rationale and historical basis of the rule were
no longer valid.
The holding of the court can be better understood by placing the
"locality rule" in its historical perspective. The rule first emerged into
our jurisprudence during the latter half of the nineteenth century and
from its inception was uniquely American.7 Although no single case
comes forward as the first case to follow a community or locality qualifi-
cation, several jurisdictions in scattered sections began holding their
"country doctors" to a lesser standard of skill than physicians in more
urban areas.8 One of the first cases9 to expound the locality rule was
Small v. Howard,10 the case overruled in the instant decision, where the
rationale embodied much of the basic reasoning put forth by other
courts of the period.
In Small, the plaintiff severely cut his wrist on a piece of glass and
engaged the defendant, a physician in a town of about 2,500, to care for
the injury. When the wound failed to heal properly a malpractice action
was lodged against the physician. In affirming the trial court's charge as
to the standard of care required of the defendant, the court stated:
It is a matter of common knowledge that a physician in a small
country village does not usually make a specialty of surgery, and,
however well informed he may be in the theory of all parts of his
profession, he would, generally speaking, be but seldom called upon
as a surgeon to perform difficult operations. He would have but few
5. 235 N.E.2d at 796.
6. Id. at 798.
7. NATHAN, MEDICAL NECLIGENCE 21 (1957). Lord Nathan stated that the locality quali-
fication has never existed in England and that English courts would reject the idea that
the standard of care should vary from one part of the country to another.
Canada does not have a locality rule, although locality is often considered as a part
of the circumstances of a given case. Sherman, The Standard of Care in Malpractice
Cases, 4 OSGOOD-HALL L.J. 222, 226 (1966).
8. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116 (1893); Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504,
30 N.W. 674 (1886); Wilmot v. Howard, 39 Vt. 447 (1867); Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt.
557 (1876); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1880); Whitesell v. Hill, 66 N.W. 894 (Iowa 1896);
Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877); and Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872).
9. The group of cases which are generally cited as the beginning point of the rule
used it with nearly identical rationales, without apparent reliance on each other. See
note 8, supra.
10. 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
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opportunities of observation and practice in that line such as pub-
lic hospitals or large cities would afford. The defendant was applied
to, being the practitioner in a small village, and we think it was
correct to rule that 'he was bound to possess that skill only which
physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability and skill, practicing in
similar localities, with opportunities for no larger experience, ordi-
narily possess; . .. 11
Other courts placed emphasis on the limited opportunity for practice
and observation 12 and the lack of modern facilities13 which rural physi-
cians, generally speaking, lacked. To resolve a practical problem the
courts sought a practical remedy to bridge the gap between urban and
rural physicians, so that a "country doctor" in a rapidly expanding na-
tion would not be confronted with a standard of conduct he could not
maintain. The practical necessity of the problem was commented on by
a writer of that period:
It [the skill of physicians] may vary in the same state or country.
There are many neighborhoods, in the West especially, where medi-
cal aid is of difficult attainment; yet cases of disease and surgery
are constantly occurring, and they must of necessity, fall into the
hands of those who have given to the subject but little, if any,
thought. Thus the inexperienced and unlearned attend the surgery
or it is not attended to at all.1
4
The response to such a problem by the courts was the implementation
of a dual standard which measured a physician's conduct by the yard-
stick of the same or similar locality.
From its birthplace in the nineteenth century the "locality rule"
emerged into the twentieth century a vibrant and almost universal doc-
trine in medical malpractice law.' 5 It quickly expanded to include den-
tists,16 chiropractors17 and kindred medical fields.' 8 As pointed out
11. Id. at 136.
12. Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286 (1872).
13. Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877).
14. McQuillen, Civil Liability of Physicians &' Surgeons for Negligence, 20 AM. L.
REv. 84 (1886).
15. One notable exception to expanding use of the "locality rule" was Vita v. Dolan,
132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916), where the court stated at 1081 of 155 N.W. 1077:
We think it is plainly correct that the locality in which the physician or surgeon
practices must be considered in determining whether he has the requisite skill and
learning, but we do not think that he is bound to possess and exercise only that
degree of skill and learning possessed by other practitioners in the same locality ....
16. Ernen v. Crofwell, 272 Mass. 176, 172 N.E. 73 (1930); Dolan v. O'Rourke, 56 N.D.
416, 217 N.W. 666 (1928).
17. Howe v. McCoy, 113 Cal, App. 468, 298 P. 530 (1931).
18. Oculists, Black v. Bearden, 167 Ark. 455, 268 S.W. 27 (1925); X-ray technicians,
George v. Shannon, 92 Kan. 801, 142 P. 967 (1914), and Sauers v. Smits, 49 Wash. 557,
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above, the rule was designed to inject a medium of flexibility into the
standard of skill and care thus providing a buffer between rural and
urban physicians. At its inception the rule encompassed a broad area,
grouping rural and small town doctors under the heading of the same
or similar locality.19 During the twentieth century, however, many
courts applied the rule to only the locality or community in which the
defendant physician practiced. 20 In an action against a dentist one court
noted that the doctor would not be liable "if in the exercise of his judg-
ment he followed the course of treatment advocated by a considerable
number of his professional brethern in good standing in his commu-
nity .... ,,21 Instead of being a buffer between the standard required of
urban and rural physicians it became a wall dividing each community,
town or city into a locality to measure the standard of care of physicians
who practiced within it.
The rule, as a result, was being molded to fit changes in society. Of-
ten the decisions seemed inimical to the original sheme of the rule.
The courts, however, sensing the need for a variable standard to deal
with differences in skill and care modified the rule to meet existing
circumstances. Many courts broadened what may be included under
the term locality or community. In Tvedt v. Haugen2 2 the court stated
that "the borders of the locality or community have, in effect, been ex-
tended so as to include those centers rapidly accessible where appropri-
ate treatment may be had .... ,,23 Thus communities close to large cities
or contiguous communities may be considered as one locality in deter-
mining the standard of care required. 24 Other courts have taken special-
ists out of the purview of the rule, reasoning that one who holds himself
out to be a specialist will be held to the same standard as all others who
hold themselves out as having the same skill.2 5
95 P. 1097 (1908). For a general collection of cases dealing with the "locality rule" and
medical fields other than physicians see 41 AM. JUR. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 87, 88
(1942); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 43 (1951).
19. Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877). There the court placed emphasis on the
"similar locality" of the rule, reasoning that all doctors in a particular locality may be
grossly negligent, which result the rule was not intended to protect.
20. Moore v. Smith, 215 Ala. 592, 111 So. 918 (1927); Bouffard v. Canby, 292 Mass.
305, 198 N.E. 253 (1935); Coon v. Shields, 88 Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348 (1934).
21. Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa. Super. 192, 201, 163 A. 341, 344 (1932).
22. 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
23. 294 N.W. at 188.
24. Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental Co., 300 Mass. 223, 15 N.E.2d 185 (1938), where
the county was considered the locality. Warnock v. Kraft, 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 85 P.2d
505 (1938), where Los Angeles and Pasadena were considered contiguous. See also, McCoid,
supra note 3, at 571, 572.
25. Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Hundley v. Martinez, 158
S.E2d 159 (W. Va..1967).
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Another area where the locality rule has been molded to fit changing
circumstances is in the use of expert testimony. Negligence in medical
malpractice must be proven by the testimony offered by other physicians
and surgeons.26 As the locality rule emerged so also did the requirement
that the expert testimony was limited to experts from the same commu-
nity or locality as the defendant.27 Very often a plaintiff, because of the
"conspiracy of silence" among doctors in a community, would have
great difficulty in obtaining expert testimony.28 Recently, a number of
courts have broadened this base to permit witnesses from other com-
munities, often major medical centers, to testify if they have a knowl-
edge of the medical practice in the particular locality in question.2 9
The "locality rule" is followed by most jurisdictions today, although
usually with one or more of the modifications outlined above. The es-
sence of the rule, as applied by the courts, is spelled out by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,30 using rationale similar to that of the early
cases which first expounded the rule. It states that some consideration
must be given to the geographic vicinity where the physician practices.
The Restatement is emphatic in pointing out, however, that the rule
is the same or similar locality, not the same locality.31 This is indicative
of the current trend away from the strict application the courts had
been using, toward the more flexible standard of the original rule.
The court in Brune could have chosen several of the modifications
26. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2090(a) (3d ed. 1940). The exceptions to this general
rule are where a common layman could understand the nature of the act, and in rare
instances res ipsa loquitur. See McCoid, supra note 3, at 614, 631.
27. Tanner v. Sanders, 247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d 718 (1933). The court there held that in
a city of 350,000 the defendant dentist was to be judged only by doctors from within
the city.
28. The "conspiracy of silence" among doctors was taken judicial notice of in the case
of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). See also,
Ames, Modern Techniques In The Preparation and Trial of a Medical Malpractice Suit,
12 VAND. L. REV. 649 (1959).
29. Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949), Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 772 (1949);
Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119,
43 N.W.2d 121 (1950).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
31. Id., comment g, which states:
Type of Community.
Allowance must be made also for the type of community in which the actor carries
on his practice. A country doctor cannot be expected to have the equipment, facili-
ties, experience, knoivledge or opportunity to obtain it, afforded him by a large city.
The standard is not, however, that of a particular locality. If there are only three
physicians in a small town, and all three are highly incompetent, they cannot be
permitted to set a standard of utter inferiority. . . . The standard is rather that of
persons engaged in similar practice in similar localities, considering geographical
location, size, and character of the community in general.
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previously mentioned and reached a result favorable to the appellants.3 2
They chose, however, to break new ground and discard locality as a
determining criterion in the standard of care. The court viewed the
current trend33 as a movement away from the Restatement and the ma-
jority of courts toward that advocated by Professor Prosser, who stated:
The present tendency is to abandon any such formula, and treat
the size and character of the community, in instructing the jury, as
merely one factor to be taken into account in applying the general
professional standard.3 4
The rationale, simply stated, is that due to modernization in transporta-
tion, communication, and medical education, geographic distinctions
are becoming nonexistent. The geographic setting of a particular case
deserves only to be considered as part of the circumstances rather than
a determining factor.
The immediate ramifications of the Massachusetts decision are,
broadly speaking, twofold. First, it adds strength and precedent to the
movement away from the "locality rule." Secondly, as the "locality rule"
is abandoned so will restrictions as to who is qualified to be an expert
witness. This should obviate any remaining obstacles due to the "con-
spiracy of silence".
It is submitted that the instant decision is following the historical
evolution of the rule. When the rule was first enunciated the nation
was easily divided into two classes, as the nation grew, however, the gap
between urban and rural was not easily distinguishable. Instead of a
movement from the city to the small town or country side there ap-
peared towns and cities of various sizes. Due to the inherent flexibility
of the rule, it was easily molded to provide a separate standard for each
community. Modern developments in communication and tranporta-
tion have closed this gap and the courts shifted toward an implementa-
tion which reflected this progress. The Massachusetts court views its
decision as the next logical step in the evolution of the rule. In the last
analysis, amortization is the very end the rule seeks to achieve.
David L. Gilmore
32. The defendant was a specialist not a general practitioner, thus the court could
have discarded the "locality rule" only in regard to specialists. New Bedford is close
enough to Boston for the two to be considered contiguous for the purposes of medical
skill and care.
33. Pederson v. Dumochel, 431 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1967); Hundley v. Martinez, 158
S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Tvedt
v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
34. W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTS 167 (3d ed. 1964).
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